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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution
has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of
such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single
photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over
1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing
detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices
using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of
criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Progress in the development of quantum computers, in addition to number theory, can potentially render the
security of current cryptographic techniques obsolete. As such, it has become necessary to consider other means
for secure communication. Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic secure communica-
tion which is guaranteed by the laws of physics.1 Such a technique would thus be immune to any eavesdropping
attempts, whether by a quantum or so-called classical computer. The technology has rapidly been brought to
maturity during the past decade, with secure key rates exceeding 1 Mbit/s [Ref. 2] and communication distances
covering hundreds of kilometers.3
However, the components used for its implementation can deviate from their ideal behaviour and this can
create loopholes which an eavesdropper, conventionally known as Eve, can exploit to gain knowledge of a final
key by means of a side-channel attack.4 Such loopholes can be removed through the development of new QKD
protocols which consider imperfections in practical QKD implementations. One prominent example is the decoy
state protocol, which permits efficient key distribution with attenuated laser sources and is secure against photon
number splitting attacks.5,6 A complementary and equally important approach is to develop a set of best practice
criteria for QKD manufacturers and users in order to implement and operate QKD in a secure manner.7 For
example,in Refs. 8 and 9 criteria to prevent the Trojan-horse attack targeting imperfections in the modulation
optics have been developed and successfully applied.
Attacks on single photon detectors have attracted significant research attention,10–13 because they are central
to a QKD system and are naturally exposed to Eve’s optical manipulation through the quantum channel. In
the so-called blinding attacks, Eve forces the receiver’s, known as Bob, semiconductor avalanche photodiodes
(APDs) to lose their single photon sensitivity by injecting strong laser light into the quantum channel. This
attack was demonstrated to be effective against early commercial QKD systems containing MHz gated InGaAs
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detectors.10 These attacks are avoidable due to the intrinsic gain modulation effect in gated InGaAs APDs when
the detector circuits are appropriately set.14,15
Significant advances have been achieved recently in single photon detection technologies using semiconductor
InGaAs APDs.16 With sine-wave gating17 and self-differencing (SD) techniques,18 InGaAs APDs can now be
gated at a clock rate exceeding 1 GHz and have a single photon detection efficiency up to 55%.19 Gigahertz gated
InGaAs APDs have thus drastically improved the QKD secure key rate.20–24 To ensure the security of these
systems, it is necessary to develop a set of criteria for correctly setting these detectors, thus avoiding similar
attacks that successfully targeted early QKD systems. Here, we approach this goal by carefully characterising
gigahertz-clocked SD detectors under strong continuous wave illumination. We pay particular attention to the
chosen discrimination level and how to correctly choose this value. We go on to show that, if this prescription is
followed, the blinding described above cannot succeed.
2. GEIGER MODE OPERATION AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO BLINDING
ATTACKS
In this section we briefly review Geiger mode APDs and the technique used to blind them. Original implemen-
tations of these devices involved the use of passive quenching. This involved the placing of a resistor in series
between the DC source and the APD.25 Its purpose was the suppression of avalanches which would otherwise
be self-sustaining and forbid the APD from further detection. Due to the long hold-off time of this technique,
gating was developed in order to improve the count rates. This method involves applying a DC voltage just
below the device’s breakdown voltage and then periodically biasing it above and below this value with an AC
signal, shown in a circuit diagram in Figure 1. The periodic gating is in itself the quenching mechanism as the
act of bringing the bias below the breakdown voltage suppresses further avalanches, therefore making the use of
an additional resistor redundant. The amount of voltage applied over the breakdown voltage is known as the
excess voltage, Vex.
Figure 1. Circuit diagram of a conventional gated Geiger mode APD
Attacks on these detectors have exploited the impedance existing in the DC path, labeled as RBias in Figure
1. By illuminating the detector with very intense light, the product of the generated photocurrent and the
aforementioned impedance causes the bias to the APD to lower such that no excess voltage can be achieved
and therefore the detector never enters Geiger mode. Consequently it is no longer sensitive to single photons
and behaves as a photocurrent detector. Eve can then apply her own strong pulses and thus control when the
detector registers a click.10 It has however been shown that if these detectors are operated appropriately such
an attack cannot succeed. In this context, this required removing the unnecessary bias resistor in the circuit (or
at least reducing its impedance) and setting an appropriate discrimination level.15
3. PRINCIPLE OF THE SELF-DIFFERENCING CIRCUIT
In contrast to conventional gated mode operation, the self-differencing circuit cancels out the APD capacitive
response and therefore SD APDs can detect extremely weak avalanches thereby allowing gigahertz clocked
operation. This involves taking the output signal of a gated APD and splitting it in two. One arm is then
delayed by one gating period, i.e. 1 ns for a 1 GHz gated APD as in this study. The two arms are then combined
by means of a differencer. This results in the cancellation of the capacitive response leaving only the avalanche,
which is a positive and negative peak, in the remaining signal, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Example waveform showing a self-differenced avalanche.
However, the background cancellation technique can also affect the avalanche signals themselves. It is im-
possible to discriminate two consecutive, identical avalanches by a SD detector, because of cancellation by the
SD. In theory, this effect can allow Eve to completely blind the detector with a moderate optical power. By illu-
minating the APD with CW light of sufficient intensity, it is possible to deterministically produce an avalanche
with each gate, thereby forcing a complete cancellation of avalanche signals and bringing the detection count
rate to zero.13,26 Assuming identical avalanche amplitudes, the detection probability (Pdet) can be simulated
using
Pdet = (1− e−µη) · e−µη, (1)
where the first term is the probability that an avalanche occurs in a gate. The following term is then the
probability of no avalanche occurring in the following gate. It can be seen that as µη becomes very large the
second term, and therefore the whole expression, tends to zero.
We can estimate the optical power required to blind a conventional gated detector with the mechanism
described in section 2. The actual excess voltage whilst the APD is under illumination can be described with
the following
V ′ex = Vex − I ·Rbias, (2)
where I is the generated photocurrent. This shows that if both I and Rbias are reasonably large, it is possible
to make V ′ex zero or negative. This highlights the importance of making Rbias as small as possible. However
removing the bias resistor does not cause this to be zero as an intrinsic resistance exists in the circuit which
we measure to be approximately 1kΩ. Assuming an excess voltage of 4.4 V, an incident optical power of larger
than 4.4 mW is required to bring the APD out of Geiger mode. By examining equation 1, we can see that an
incident optical power of just under 60 nW is sufficient to blind a 1 GHz gated SD detector (assuming a pulsed
laser of the same repetition frequency and a detection efficiency of 10 %), nearly 5 orders of magnitude smaller.
Since the required optical power for blinding is much smaller, it makes detection of an eavesdropper through
monitoring of the photocurrent15 less straightforward.
4. OPERATING AND CHARACTERISING THE APD
Figure 3 shows the schematic for the charcterisation setup for self-differencing detectors. A commercial In-
GaAs/InP APD is electrically biased through a bias-T with a square wave input clocked at of 1 GHz applied
using a pulse generator as the AC input, superimposed on top of a constant DC bias provided by a source measure
unit. The APD is thermo-electrically cooled to - 30 ◦ C. The APD is illuminated by a laser, the intensity of which
is controlled by a cascade of two variable optical attenuators providing 120 dB intensity variation range. The
output of the APD signal is fed into a self-differencing circuit before being measured by either an oscilloscope or
a photon counter.
Figure 3. Schematic of the experimental set-up. SMU: Source Measure Unit; LD: Laser Diode; VOA: Variable Optical
Attenuator: SD: Self-differencer.
When first setting up the detector it is important to carry out a series of steps in order to systematically
arrive at the most appropriate way of operating it. This prescription is given as follows:
• Determine the APD’s breakdown voltage. This is taken as the point at which the generated current exceeds
10 µA27 when the APD is biased with the DC signal only and without optical illumination. The breakdown
voltage of the APD under test is found to be 51.8 V.
• Set the initial DC and AC biases. The initial DC bias is set just below the breakdown voltage. An AC
signal is set at a sufficient level to enable single photon avalanches, i.e., approximately 5-10 V. In the
present case, we choose 51.6 V (V
(1)
DC) and 4.6 V (V
(1)
AC ) for DC and AC signals, respectively.
• Set a coarse discrimination level. This is set by lowering the DC bias such that the APD never experiences
any excess bias and therefore does not produce any single-photon or dark counts. Under this condition,
the SD output contains only the uncanceled background signal. The coarse discrimination level is set as
the lowest level with which the counting electronics produces a count rate of zero such that all of the
background is neglected. This coarse discrimination level can then be used when varying the DC and AC
signals to find the optimum detector characteristics as in the next step.
• Optimise the biasing conditions. This involves adjusting the DC and AC levels around V (1)DC and V (1)AC to
optimise the detector performance, such as detection efficiency, dark count rate and afterpulse probability.
The detailed procedure for this step can be found in a previous publication.19 We refer to the optimised





• Set the final discrimination level under the optimal biases of V (2)DC and V (2)AC . This step is necessary because
the capacitance of an APD is bias dependent and so is the uncancelled capacitive signal background. Under
dark conditions, the detector count rate is measured as a function of the discrimination level. An example
result is shown in Fig. 4. The point where the count rate changes dramatically signals the detection of
the noise floor. Therefore, one should choose a discrimination level just above this to ensure an optimal
detection efficiency while rejecting all uncancelled capacitive background contributing to the dark counts.
Following the above steps, the discrimination level for the APD under test is set to 18 mV. The corresponding
detection efficiency and dark count rate are determined to be 26% and 22 kHz, respectively.
Figure 4. A graph showing the count rate as a function of discrimination level. V* indicates the value corresponding to
an appropriate choice of level.
5. SD APD UNDER STRONG ILLUMINATION
Having set the operating conditions and determined the APD’s characteristics, we then examine the behavior of
the SD APD under strong optical illumination. A 1606 nm continuous wave diode laser is used for illumination.
This wavelength laser was chosen because it can offer the optical power that is required to achieve strong
illumination. At this illumination wavelength, the APD was found to exhibit a similar quantum efficiency to the
more standard telecom wavelength of 1550 nm. We measure the photon count rate as a function of the incident
photon flux ranging from 10−5 to 108 photons per ns for two different discrimination levels. The first of these
is set appropriately at 18 mV whereas the second one is very inappropriately set at 35 mV. The measurement
results are shown in Figure 5.
At low photon fluxes (<10 photons per ns), the photon count rates show a linear dependence with the incident
optical power, suggesting that the APD is behaving as a single photon detector. Further increasing the incident
optical power leads first to count rate saturation and then the count rate drop for photon fluxes exceeding 104
per ns. This drop is a result of SD cancellation, as predicted by equation 1. However, when using an appropriate
discrimination level, the count rate does not drop to zero, contrary to the aforementioned prediction. The count
rate even recovers at very high photon fluxes.
We note that the experimentally measured count rates drop much slower than the prediction in 1 at photon
fluxes > 10. As has previously been reported,13,26 part of the reason for this disagreement is that the simulation
assumes the avalanche amplitudes are photon number independent. In reality this is not true as such detectors
have even been shown to have photon number resolving capabilities.28 This means that since adjacent avalanches
may have different amplitudes they may not always cancel to below the set discrimination level.
Figure 5. Count rate as a function of incident flux for discrimination levels of 18 and 35 mV with a plot of the simulation
in equation 1
We attribute the count rate recovery to the intensity fluctuation of the laser diode, which we measure to
be 0.6%. We further confirm this attribution by reducing the bias current to our laser so that the intensity
fluctuations are now 9.2% we find that recovery occurs sooner.
In the case when the inappropriate discrimination level of 35 mV is used, the detector can be completely
blinded, i.e., the count rate falling to zero, for photon fluxes between 106 and 5× 107. This highlights that the
detector has become vulnerable to blinding attacks.
6. DISCUSSION
In the previous section, we demonstrated that the behavior of the detector under strong illumination is closely
linked to the choice of discrimination level as well as the intensity stability of the laser used for the blinding
attack. Under an inappropriately high discrimination level, it is straightforward to blind a SD detector with a
continuous-wave laser of moderate power, suggesting that incorrectly set detectors exhibit security loopholes. We
therefore stress the importance of following the procedure given in section 4. Once this prescription is followed,
it is significantly harder for Eve to blind the detector. A small intensity fluctuation existing in the laser output
can effectively prevent the detector from being blinded because of the sensitivity of self-differencing circuits to
non-periodic signal variations. Even with a perfectly stable laser source, it may still be difficult for Eve to blind
a SD detector in a QKD setup due to the instability in Bob’s interferometer which may cause fluctuations in
the optical signal reaching the detectors. For example, QKD that employs active basis choice can easily bring
an intensity fluctuation of signals reaching an individual detector.
In conclusion we have examined how to best operate and characterise an SD APD. We have established the
best procedure for setting an appropriate discrimination level and have shown that this ensures the self-differencer
cannot be completely blinded with an ordinary diode laser with fluctuating intensity output.
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